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INTRODUCTION
Consumers making purchases on the Internet are well practiced at
scrolling through and "agreeing" to "Terms and Conditions" with
extraordinary speed and extraordinarily little thought. These terms
frequently include an arbitration provision that deprives the consumer of
the right to sue if a dispute arises. The combination of a significant
contract provision with a particularly problematic method of contract
formation raises serious problems for consumers and for contract law.
These problems are exacerbated by the increasing likelihood that the
consumer will be viewing and agreeing to on-line contract terms not
through the large screen of a desktop computer, but rather through the
tiny screen of a cell phone or similar device.
The ability of contract law to meet these challenges is jeopardized by
the combined effect of two federal statutes: the Federal Arbitration Act'
(FAA) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act2 (E-SIGN). The FAA provides virtually no protection for
consumers and, to make matters worse, largely federalizes what would
otherwise be an area of state authority E-SIGN adds to the problem by
significantly limiting the ability of the states to regulate electronic
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2000).
3. See discussion infra Part II.
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commerce even in the face of changing technologies. The FAA and
E-SIGN are generally believed to leave little room for meaningful state
regulation of arbitration provisions in cyberspace.' This Article takes a
contrary view. I argue that notwithstanding the FAA and E-SIGN, there
is meaningful space for state law regulation of arbitration provisions in
consumer Internet transactions and that securing this space restores a
proper balance between state and federal law.
This space for state regulation exists because only "written" arbitration
provisions are within the scope of the FAA.' Written text and
electronically displayed text differ from each other. For instance, the
term "written" connotes a tangibility and materiality that is lacking in
text on a website. In some contexts, the differences between written text
and electronically displayed text do not matter. However, those
differences are relevant when it comes to the applicability of the FAA to
arbitration provisions in consumer contracts formed over the Internet.
Reaching this conclusion requires a discussion of the purpose of the
FAA's limitation to written provisions.
In this Article, I challenge the conventional wisdom that the FAA's
"written" limitation was intended primarily to ensure sufficient evidence
of an arbitration agreement. I argue that this "statute of frauds"
approach to the "written" limitation largely misses the mark. I contend
that when Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, it excluded oral and other
non-written arbitration agreements from the FAA's coverage because
agreements in those forms do not sufficiently register a choice to
arbitrate and do not sufficiently impart the seriousness of that choice. In
the current commercial environment, arbitration provisions on consumer
websites are the closest equivalent to what oral and other unwritten
arbitration provisions were in 1925-a form of contracting notable for its
casual nature and its failure in most instances to register meaningful
choice or to impart seriousness. Arbitration provisions in consumer
Internet transactions are thus properly excluded from the FAA. States
should generally be able to regulate such provisions as they see fit.
This interpretation of "written" must be reconciled with E-SIGN.
E-SIGN generally ensures that electronic documents are given the same
effect as written documents. E-SIGN could thus be seen as requiring
that arbitration provisions in electronic form be treated the same as those
in written form. While I acknowledge and discuss that argument, I take a
contrary position and argue that E-SIGN does not dictate that text on an
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part III.B.3 and Part IV.A.
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2; infra text accompanying note 37.
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Internet website must always be considered "written" for purposes of the
FAA.
As an initial matter, when Congress passed E-SIGN in 2000, the
dominant paradigm for Internet access was that of a computer user
sitting at a desktop computer that was attached to a printer and a large
monitor. But that paradigm no longer prevails. Small mobile devices
capable of accessing the Internet wirelessly, virtually unknown when E-
SIGN was enacted, are proliferating. This shift in the way that the
Internet is accessed puts serious pressure on the assumptions underlying
E-SIGN and should lead courts to apply E-SIGN with care.
Further, I argue that interpreting "written" to exclude at least some
electronically displayed text from the scope of the FAA recalibrates the
balance between state and federal arbitration law in an appropriate way
and in an appropriate context. This is particularly true because it is not
clear that the FAA was intended to cover consumer contracts in the first
place and because online standardized consumer contracts raise a
number of troubling issues that their written cousins do not.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I provide some background
on the FAA, including the law prior to the FAA's passage in 1925. In
Part II, I describe how the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the
scope and impact of the FAA at the expense of state law. In Part III, I
discuss the FAA's limitation to written provisions or written agreements
to arbitrate and I argue that "written" should not be read to include text
on Internet websites (at least in the consumer context). In Part IV, I
discuss E-SIGN. I argue that E-SIGN does not require that "written" in
the FAA be read to include all electronically displayed text. And in Part
V, I argue that the interpretation of "written" that this Article urges
would limit the FAA in ways consistent with Congress' intent in passing
the FAA.
A Concrete Example: The Proposed State Arbitration Law
Before I proceed to the body of the Article, I pause to present a simple
draft of a state law relating to arbitration agreements. I am not
advocating for passage of this law, which I will refer to as the "Proposed
State Arbitration Law." Instead, I will use it as a concrete example to
illustrate various points throughout the Article.
The Proposed State Arbitration Law provides:
(a) Arbitration provisions in consumer contracts that are not in
interstate commerce must be conspicuous.
(b) Arbitration provisions in consumer contracts that are
formed over the Internet must be conspicuous.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law Preceding the Passage of the FAA
Understanding why Congress passed federal arbitration legislation in
1925 requires some brief background on the common law at that time.
The common law severely hindered the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate future disputes. These agreements were largely ineffectual
because they could not be enforced in equity Instead, if a dispute arose,
a party to a contract with an arbitration agreement could sue in court
even if the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration provision.8
The existence of the arbitration agreement could not be asserted as a bar
to the action.' Further, any party to a contract that included an
arbitration agreement could revoke the arbitration agreement at any
time before an award was entered.10 These common law rules, which
were sometimes referred to collectively as the rule of revocability," had
been "almost universally accepted" by American jurisdictions in the
early twentieth century.12
This hostility towards arbitration agreements was explained in a
variety of ways. One explanation was the "expressed fear on the part of
the courts that arbitration tribunals [lacked] the means to give full or
proper redress" to an aggrieved party. 3 Another explanation was that
the common law rules were designed to protect stronger parties from
14taking away the rights of weaker ones. Others explained the hostility as
7. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16-17 (1924)
[hereinafter Joint Arbitration Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member,
American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law;
General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce); S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2
(1924) ("[I]t is very old law that the performance of a written agreement to arbitrate
would not be enforced in equity, and that if an action at law were brought on the contract
containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could not be pleaded in the bar of
the action .... ").
8. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2.
9. Id.
10. Id; see also WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 45 (1930).
11. See STURGES, supra note 10, at 45 (explaining that "either or both of the[se] ...
rules are generally intended [by the term 'revocable']").
12. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2.
13. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2.
14. See Joint Arbitration Hearings, supra note 7, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry
Cohen, Member, American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade, and
Commercial Law; General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce) ("[T]he real
fundamental cause was that at the time this rule was made people were not able to take
care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage of the
weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them").
2008]
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a result of judicial resistance to agreements that would "oust the courts
of their jurisdiction."'" But a number of courts simply enforced the
common law rules because the rules had become so firmly established. 6
In fact, there were quite a few opinions that articulated the view that the
common law rules were neither just nor logical, but that enforced the
rules nonetheless based only on the well settled nature of the common
law rules." As Judge Cardozo observed, the doctrine of revocability had
been criticized by many courts as "anomalous and unjust" and "was
followed with frequent protest, in deference to early precedents."' 8
B. Arbitration Reform: A State-Led Initiative
The drive against the common law rule of revocability was not a "top
down" effort. Instead, it began in the states. 9 Efforts, led primarily by
the New York State Chamber of Commerce, to "break[] loose" from the
common law resulted in the 1920 passage of an arbitration statute by the
New York legislature.0 The New York Arbitration Law, which was the
"first of the American statutes seeking to make arbitration really
effective, 21 stated that a "provision in a written contract to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between the parties . . . shall
be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 2 2 The New York
statute declared "a new public policy" regarding arbitration and operated
to "abrogate[] [the] ancient rule" that made arbitration agreements
21revocable.
15. STURGES, supra note 10, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. S. REP. No. 68-526, at 3 ("[E]stablished precedent has had its large part of course
in perpetuating the old rules long after the courts themselves could no longer see that they
were founded in reason or justice.").
17. See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1007-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (sharply criticizing the rule of revocability but upholding it due to
the rule's firmly settled nature); Henry v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 64 A. 635, 636 (Pa.
1906) (per curiam) (noting that it was "much to be regretted that agreements to arbitrate
... should be excepted from the general law of contracts and treated as revocable by one
party without consent of the other," but upholding the rule of revocability as "too firmly
settled to be changed without legislative authority").
18. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921).
19. See generally J. P. Chamberlain, The Commercial Arbitration Law, 9 A.B.A.J. 523
(1923) (discussing the approaches taken by states in adopting arbitration enforcement
legislation).
20. Id. at 524.
21. See Am. Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Grier, 108 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Mich.
1961) (Smith, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
22. New York Arbitration Law, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. LAWS 803, reprinted in STURGES,
supra note 10, at 92 (current version at N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7501 (McKinney 1998)).
23. Berkovitz, 130 N.E. at 289.
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Within a decade of New York's enactment of an arbitration law, a
number of states followed suit and adopted similar statutes: New Jersey
enacted its statute in 1923; Massachusetts and Hawaii24 in 1925;
California and Pennsylvania in 1927; Louisiana in 1928; and Arizona,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island in 1929.2 In the midst
of the passage of these state laws, the FAA, which followed along the
lines of the New York statute,26 was enacted in 1925. 2' The FAA, then,
was not the shepherd leading the flock. It was just one of the sheep. The
initiative and model for the FAA came from state law.
C. The Passage of the FAA
Largely at the urging of the American Bar Association, Congress
enacted the United States Arbitration Act (as the FAA was originally
titled).28 The FAA was primarily passed to undo the rule of revocability
and to put arbitration agreements on "the same footing" as other types
of contracts.29 According to the House Report accompanying the bill:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and
the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live
up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his
contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An
arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs.0
The FAA was intended to deal with what the House Report describes
as "an anachronism" in the law (i.e., the rule of revocability) that
mandated that courts refuse to enforce "specific agreements to
arbitrate."31 As the House Report notes, despite judicial criticism of the
rule, "courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment. 3 2  Therefore, the FAA
24. At the time, Hawaii was a territory, and not yet a state. Hawaii became a state in
1959. Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4.
25. STURGES, supra note 10, at 88.
26. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 8 (1924).
27. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
28. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 & n.2 (1926). There are a number of excellent and detailed
descriptions of the history surrounding the passage of the FAA. See, e.g., IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 15-101 (1992); Margaret M. Harding, The
Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as
a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 425-37 (1998).
29. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); see also Harding, supra note 28, at 435.
30. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
"declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced,
and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.,
33
D. Section 2: The Act's Primary Substantive Provision
The FAA achieved its purpose of putting arbitration provisions on the
same footing as other contracts primarily through section 2 of the Act.3
Section 2 provides in part that "[a] written provision in ... a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction.., shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.,
35
The Supreme Court has described section 2 as the "primary
substantive provision" of the FAA.36 The first part of section 2, along
with section 1 of the FAA,37 "purport[s] to determine what arbitration
agreements qualify" for coverage under the FAA." That is, it covers
"written provision[s]" to arbitrate disputes when such provisions are
found in "contract[s] evidencing . . . transaction[s] involving
commerce."39 Thus, the first part of section 2 describes the scope of the
FAA and has been referred to by the Court as providing "the basic
coverage authorization. ' 4°
One consequence of an arbitration agreement falling within the
coverage of the FAA is that the agreement is then enforceable in the
federal courts through the procedural mechanisms and rules set forth in
the FAA.41 But there is a second, even more critical consequence (at
least for purposes of the FAA's impact on state law) of an arbitration
33. Id. Similarly, the Senate Report also indicates that the legislation was motivated
primarily by a need to undo the rule of revocability and to empower the federal courts to
enforce arbitration agreements. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
35. Id. Section 2 also applies to arbitration provisions in maritime transactions, but
that matter is beyond the scope of this Article. Id.
36. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 1. Section 1 defines some terms and exempts from the coverage of the
FAA "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
38. Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to
Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 586
(1952).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
40. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001).
41. For example, section 3 of the FAA requires a federal court to stay an action
pending arbitration if the action is based on an issue that is covered by a qualifying
arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Under section 4, a federal court is required to issue
an order "directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement." Id. § 4.
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agreement falling within the scope of section 2. Arbitration provisions
that fall within the scope described by the first part of section 2 are
subject to the last part of section 2. These provisions are "valid,
42irrevocable, and enforceable" under federal law, unless they are
rendered unenforceable by a narrow category of state law-only "such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
4
1
I discuss the balance between federal and state arbitration law in the
FAA in more detail in the next part of the Article.
II. ARBITRATION ASCENDANT: THE FEDERAL CRUNCH ON STATE LAW
Section 2 provides two points at which the balance between federal
and state law can be calibrated. First, the scope language of section 2
could either be read broadly to encompass more arbitration agreements
(thus increasing the federal role) or narrowly to encompass fewer
arbitration agreements (thus increasing the state role). 4 Second, the
savings clause could be read to permit either comparatively more or less
state regulation of arbitration provisions.45 At both these points, the
Supreme Court has acted to increase the federal role at the expense of
the state role. In Part II.A, I describe how the Court has read the
language of the FAA to expand the Act's scope. In Part II.B, I describe
how the Court has read the savings clause of section 2 to minimize the
ability of state law to regulate arbitration provisions.
A. The Supreme Court's Expansion of the Scope of Section 2
The Supreme Court has, over the past few decades, systematically read
the language of the scope portion of section 2 (and relevant language in
section 1) to expand the range of arbitration agreements falling within
the scope of the FAA. As noted above, section 2 applies to "[a] written
provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction.
4 6
The FAA defines "commerce,, 47 but does not define the other key
terms in section 2. It is, accordingly, left to the courts to determine the
meaning of terms such as "involving commerce," "transaction," "written
42. Id. § 2.
43. Id.
44. See generally id.
45. By "savings clause" I mean the part of the statute that provides for the
applicability of some, but not all, state laws: "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 1 (defining commerce as "commerce among the several States or with
foreign nations").
2008]
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provision," and so forth. In the following subsections I describe how the
Court has consistently read these and other terms quite broadly. Thus,
most of the space within which states could have operated has already
been put beyond the reach of state law. One key exception is the
reference to a "written provision," which remains one of the last
opportunities to maintain meaningful space for state law.
Before addressing specific language from section 2, it may first be
useful to describe the two key Supreme Court precedents that laid the
foundation for much of the expansive reading of section 2. First, in 1967,
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court
held that the FAA, and not state arbitration law, was applicable to cases
that were in federal court due to diversity jurisdiction.48 Second, and of
signal importance, was the Court's 1984 decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating.49 There, the Court held that despite "ambiguities" in the
legislative history," Congress had intended to create a body of
substantive law and that section 2 was applicable in state courts, as well
as federal courts. 1 The holding in Southland was a large step towards
reducing the state role in regulating arbitration provisions. Whether that
decision was correct or not has been ably addressed by many others52 and
is not the subject of this Article.
Prima Paint and Southland set the stage for the further expansion of
the role of the FAA relative to state law. Parts II.A.1-4 below each focus
on specific language that has already been expansively interpreted by the
Court. Part II.A.5 focuses on a decision by the Court to read narrowly
48. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404-05 (1967).
49. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
50. Id. at 12. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that not only is the legislative
history unambiguous, but that such legislative history demonstrates that Congress
explicitly intended that the FAA would not be applicable to state courts. Id. at 25-31
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 11-16 (majority opinion).
52. Compare Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State
Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 189-92 (2002) (arguing that the
Court decided Southland incorrectly and that the Court ignored relevant legislative history
and other material in reaching its decision), Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for
Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 864-65, 867 (2002) (arguing that the Court's statutory
interpretation left "much to be desired" and that Southland was "wrongly decided"), and
David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State
Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 554-58 (2004) (arguing, among other things, that the
conclusion in Southland that the FAA created substantive law was flawed), with
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002) (arguing that there is
significant evidence surrounding the passage of the FAA to support the position that the
FAA was intended to apply in the state courts).
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an exception to section 2 (a reading that also ensures an expansive scope
for the FAA).
1. "Involving Commerce"
The Court has expansively interpreted the phrase "involving
commerce." In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Court noted
that the language Congress typically uses to signal its intent to exercise
its full power under the Commerce Clause is "affecting commerce," not
"involving commerce."53 Thus, the Court was faced with the question of
whether "involving commerce" was synonymous with "affecting
54commerce," or whether it meant something narrower.
The Court, after examining the "language, background, and structure"
of the statute, concluded that the phrase "involving commerce" is
"broad" and was intended as "the functional equivalent of 'affecting"'
commerce.55  The Court noted, for example, that a 1933 dictionary
indicated that "involve" and "affect" can have approximately the same
meaning. Additionally, the Court noted that the FAA's legislative
history indicated an "expansive congressional intent" when it comes to
the reach of the statute.57 And the broader interpretation was, in the
Court's view, "more consistent with the Act's basic purpose, to put
arbitration provisions on 'the same footing' as a contract's other terms.
58
In reaching the conclusion it did, the Court put a great deal of potential
space beyond the reach of state law.59
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor predicted that the Court's
holding in Allied-Bruce Terminix, when coupled with the decision in
Southland that section 2 applied to the states, would "displace many state
statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers . . . and state
53. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995).
54. Id. at 273-74.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 274 (citing 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 466 (1st ed. 1933)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 275 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
59. See id. at 272-73 (noting that by adopting a broader interpretation of the language
in section 2, the Court was declining to "carv[e] out an important statutory niche in which
a State remains free to apply its antiarbitration law or policy"). The Court's subsequent
decision in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003), demonstrates how little
space the Court's broad interpretation of "involving commerce" leaves for the states.
Alafabco involved the question of whether certain debt restructuring agreements between
an Alabama lending institution and an Alabama fabrication and construction company
were transactions involving interstate commerce. Id. at 53. The Court held that they
were. Id. at 56-58. The Court stated that it was "perfectly clear that the FAA
encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually 'in commerce'-that is,
'within the flow of interstate commerce."' Id. at 56 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513
U.S. at 273).
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procedural requirements aimed at ensuring knowing and voluntary
consent."6 Justice O'Connor's prediction was accurate, as I discuss later
in the Article.6'
2. "Evidencing a Transaction"
In addition to addressing the meaning of "involving commerce," the
Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix also addressed the meaning of the
language "evidencing a transaction," and again chose a broader over a
narrower interpretation. The Court was faced with the question of
whether "evidencing a transaction" in interstate commerce means the
relevant transaction must merely have in fact involved interstate
commerce (what the Court referred to as the "commerce in fact"
interpretation) or whether the parties, at the time they entered into the
contract, must have actually contemplated substantial interstate activity. 62
The Court found the choice a close one, but concluded that the broader
"commerce in fact" interpretation was "more faithful to the statute. ' ' 63
The Court again selected the interpretation likely to place more
agreements within the scope of section 2.
3. "Transaction"
In its 2001 decision Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme
Court rejected a narrow reading of the word "transaction" in favor of a
broader and more encompassing one.64 In Adams, the Court addressed
the enforceability of an arbitration provision in an employment contract.
The former employee argued that the word "transaction" in section 2
extended "only to commercial contracts" (that is, to "'commercial deal[s]
or merchant's sale[s]"') and did not include employment contracts.65 The
Court rejected this argument and held that "transaction" should not be
66interpreted so narrowly.
60. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
62. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 277-78.
63. Id. at 280.
64. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113-15, 119 (2001).
65. Id. (quoting Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (1999)) (alterations
in original).
66. Id. at 113-19. The Court noted that reading "transaction" in the way suggested
would render superfluous the language in section 1 excepting from coverage of the FAA
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in ... interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), quoted in Adams, 532 U.S. at
113. The Court also noted it had previously required the enforcement of an arbitration
provision in a dispute that did not arise from a "commercial contract." Adams, 532 U.S. at
113 ("The proffered interpretation of 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce' . ..
would be inconsistent with Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., where we held that
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The former employee made a second argument that focused on an
exception to the FAA's coverage.67 The Court's disposition of that
argument also enlarged the scope of the FAA, as I discuss later. 
6
4. "Contract"
The Supreme Court recently gave an expansive reading to the word
"contract" in section 2 as well. In its 2006 decision Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Court addressed the specific question of
"whether a court or an arbitrator should consider the claim that a
contract containing an arbitration provision is void for illegality., 69 Thus,
the case did not directly address the state-federal balance. Nonetheless,
the Court's holding removed still more space from the state sphere.
In Buckeye Check Cashing, members of a putative class claimed that
their agreements with a lender violated Florida state lending and
consumer protection law and that therefore the agreements were void ab
initio. ° The class members pointed out that the language in section 2
applies only to arbitration agreements that involve a "contract." They
reasoned that "since an agreement void ab initio under state law is not a
'contract,' there is no 'written provision' in . . . a 'contract' to which
[section] 2 can apply.,
71
The Court refused to read the word "contract" as narrowly as the class
members urged. The Court focused on the reference in section 2 to
challenges to arbitration provisions being made "'upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'' 72 The use of
the word "contract" in this context led the Court to conclude that
"contract" refers not only to valid contracts but to "putative contracts" as
well,73 a reading that the Court described as "more natural" than the
meaning urged by the class members.74 The Court held that since this use
of "contract" necessarily had to mean "putative contract," then
"contract" must have that same meaning every time it is used in section
2.7' The Court thus rejected the class members' argument that section 2
[section] 2 required the arbitration of [a] . . . claim . . . that did not arise from a
'commercial deal or merchant's sale."' (citation omitted)). And, further, the Court noted
that it had previously given an expansive reading to the language at issue in Allied-Bruce
Terminix. Id.
67. Adams, 532 U.S. at 114.
68. See discussion infra Part II.A.5.
69. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006).
70. Id. at 443.
71. Id. at 447.
72. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 448 n.3.
75. Id. at 448.
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was not applicable. Again, the Court removed more potential space
from the state sphere through a broad reading of the language in section
2.
5. Refusal to Broaden an Exception
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, a case already discussed for its
expansive reading of the word "transaction,, 76 a former employee argued
that the arbitration provision in his employment agreement was not
within the scope of the FAA because his employment agreement was
exempted by section 1 of the FAA.77  Section 1 exempts from FAA
coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.,
78
The former employee argued that the language "'engaged in . . .
interstate commerce"' in section 1 should be read to mean that section 1
excludes from the FAA's coverage all employment contracts for workers
engaged in interstate commerce.79 Such a broad reading would have had
the effect of excluding from the FAA a large swath of employment
contracts.
The Court rejected that argument. According to the Court, the text of
the statute, interpreted through various canons of construction, did not
support the former employee's argument. 8° The Court held that the
exemption does not apply to all employees engaged in interstate
commerce. Instead, section 1 exempts only a narrow range of contracts:
"only contracts of employment of transportation workers.""s The Court
thus read the language of the exception in a narrow way-a reading that
increased the scope of the FAA.
B. Minimal State Space Provided by the Savings Clause
If an arbitration agreement falls outside of the FAA, such an
agreement is subject to the full panoply of state law. If an arbitration
provision falls within section 2 (as most arbitration provisions will, given
76. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
77. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001).
78. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
79. 532 U.S. at 114.
80. Id. at 114-16.
81. Id. at 119. The Court also rejected the former employee's argument that the
Court's position was untenable since the Court's reading exempted from coverage those
contracts "most involving interstate commerce, and thus most assuredly within the
Commerce Clause power in 1925 ... while those employment contracts having a less direct
and less certain connection to interstate commerce" would be included within the FAA.
Id. at 120. According to the Court, Congress simply wanted to make clear that
transportation workers were to be governed by federal statutes other than the FAA. Id. at
120-21.
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the discussion above), then it can still be regulated, to some degree,
under state law. Pursuant to the savings clause, an arbitration provision
within the scope of section 2 "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." The reference to "such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract" is far from clear. The Court
has interpreted that language to leave very little room for state
regulation of arbitration provisions.
The FAA is silent on whether the "grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract" are state or federal. However, courts
have assumed that the reference is to grounds under state law.83 As the
Court stated in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, "generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
contravening [section] 2."84 This purported state role is actually quite
limited. Section 2, of course, disables the rule of revocability, which was
an arbitration-specific rule permitting a party to unilaterally avoid
enforcement of an arbitration provision. The key question is the degree
to which the FAA disables other types of state regulation of arbitration
provisions.
Section 2 preempts state laws that make arbitration provisions
ineffective either generally or in specific contexts. For instance, in Perry
v. Thomas, the Court held that section 2 preempted a California statute
that provided that "actions for the collection of wages may be maintained
'without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate."'85
The statute was deemed by the Court to be an impermissible effort by a
state to "'undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements."' 86 The
Court noted that section 2 established the balance between state law
principles and federal common law, and that agreements to arbitrate that
fall within the purview of section 2 are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable as a matter of federal law" unless they are rendered
unenforceable by a principle of state law.87 But the principle of state law
must not be one that is directed against arbitration provisions in
particular. Rather, as the Court noted, "state law, whether of legislative
82. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
83. See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration
System: Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 63, 83 (Edward
Brunet et al. eds., 2006).
84. Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
85. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West
1971)).
86. Id. at 489 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)).
87. Id. at 492 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
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or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the
fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport" with the
savings clause of section 2.8
Similarly, the Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix held that an Alabama
statute that made "written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and
'unenforceable"' was preempted with respect to agreements within
section 2.89 Although that decision was relatively clear cut (the more
difficult issue in the case was whether the transaction at issue was
sufficiently in interstate commerce to fall within section 290), the Court's
reasoning and language were rather broad. The Court stated:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough
to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any
such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place
arbitration clauses on an unequal "footing" directly contrary to
the Act's language and Congress' intent.9'
Taken literally, this language seems to mean that although a contract
containing an arbitration provision may be deemed unconscionable, the
finding of unconscionability must have nothing to do with the fact that a
provision at issue is an arbitration provision. Although at least one
commentator has noted that this language "simply cannot mean what it
sounds like,"92 lower courts cannot disregard the language or its import:
arbitration provisions may be subject to state law, but such provisions are
also largely insulated from the effect of any state law that regulates
arbitration provisions qua arbitration provisions.
Building upon the language in these cases, the Court further increased
the preemptive effect of section 2 in Casarotto.9 There, the Court was
faced with a Montana statute that provided: "'Notice that a contract is
subject to arbitration . . . shall be typed in underlined capital letters on
the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon,
the contract may not be subject to arbitration.'
94
88. Id.
89. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268-70 (1995).
90. See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
91. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 281.
92. Schwartz, supra note 52, at 562. The author notes that "a consumer contract may
establish a reasonable sales price, but provide that future disputes will be arbitrated in
Borneo before a panel of arbitrators chosen by the seller, with the consumer to pay a $1
million forum fee to arbitrate his claim." Id.
93. Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
94. Id. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (repealed 1997)).
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The Court could have viewed the Montana statute as furthering a
purpose of the FAA-that consensual arbitration agreements be
enforced.95 Instead, the Court held that the FAA preempted the
Montana statute as applied to arbitration provisions within the scope of
section 2. The Court held that state law may not "singl[e] out arbitration
provisions for suspect status" by requiring any sort of heightened notice
requirement for such provisions.9 The Court found that the "'goals and
policies' of the FAA" (primarily ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms) were "antithetical" to the
Montana statute.9i The Court held that the Montana statute placed
arbitration agreements "in a class apart" and was therefore "inconsonant
with, and.., preempted by" the FAA.98
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the FAA leaves very little
room for state law. In Preston v. Ferrer, the Court addressed a California
statute that gave a state administrative agency primary jurisdiction over
certain disputes between talent agents and artists.99 In Preston, the
parties had entered into a contract that included an arbitration
provision.O The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
administrative agency or an arbitrator should resolve a dispute that was
arguably subject to the California statute.10 The Court held that "[w]hen
parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA
supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum,
whether judicial or administrative."""
These cases make clear that the space available to the states under the
savings clause is extremely limited.'3 For instance, the Proposed State
95. See Brunet, supra note 83, at 69; cf Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 705-07 (1996) (arguing that Congress should amend the FAA to permit states to
regulate arbitration provisions to ensure that consent to such provisions is knowingly
given).
96. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
97. Id. at 688.
98. Id.
99. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008) (citing California Talent Agencies Act,
CAL. LAB.CODE § 1700 etseq. (West 2003 and Supp. 2008)).
100. Id. at 982.
101. Id. at 983.
102. Id. at 987.
103. Others have ably discussed how unconsionability can function as a possible check
on particularly one-sided or onerous arbitration provisions. Some commentators have
hailed the increased use of unconscionability. For instance, Professor Jeffrey Stempel has
argued that the use of unconscionability to regulate onerous arbitration provisions is
appropriate and should be encouraged and expanded. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis
as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004)
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Arbitration Law may seem like an innocuous statute that merely imposes
a conspicuousness requirement on arbitration provisions within its scope.
But like the Montana statute in Casarotto, the Proposed State
Arbitration Law imposes a special notice requirement on arbitration
provisions and would be preempted to the extent that it applies to
contracts within the scope of section 2. The Proposed State Arbitration
Law would not be preempted insofar as it applies to arbitration
provisions in purely intrastate contracts (since Casarotto only applies to
arbitration provisions within the scope of section 2). But the Proposed
State Arbitration Law has more ambition than just to apply to intrastate
contracts-it purports to apply to consumer Internet contracts as well.
Whether those contracts are within the scope of the FAA (i.e., whether
they are "written provisions" to arbitrate) is the subject of the next part
of the Article.
III. THE "WRITTEN" LIMITATION IN THE FAA
As noted above, most of the key language in section 2 has already been
construed by the Supreme Court in a fashion that expands the scope of
the FAA at the expense of state law. But the Court has not yet
construed the FAA's limitation to "written provision[s]" to arbitrate.
Interpreting that language to exclude consumer Internet transactions is
one of the last ways through which meaningful space can be reserved to
the states for the regulation of arbitration provisions. This Part of the
Article argues that the term "written provision" should be construed to
exclude arbitration provisions in electronically displayed text in
consumer contracts formed over Internet websites. In Part III.A, I
provide an overview of the FAA's limitation to written arbitration
provisions. In Part III.B, I describe some crucial differences between
electronically displayed text on a consumer website and written text on
paper. I also describe the only case of which I am aware that fully and
directly addresses whether "written" in the FAA includes electronically
displayed text. In Part III.C, I address the critical question of the
underlying purpose of the FAA's "written" limitation. I argue that non-
("[A] reasonably vigorous unconscionability doctrine remains an appropriate and
important means for courts to prevent arbitration abuses."). On the other hand,
Professors Stephen Broome and Susan Randall see the use of unconscionability as
evidencing a renewed (and FAA-prohibited) return to singling out arbitration provisions
for hostile treatment. See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 44-48 (2006); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes
Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194-96
(2004). But the regulation of one-sided arbitration provisions is not the focus of this
article. Instead, I am focused on the ability of states to regulate arbitration provisions as
arbitration provisions.
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written arbitration provisions were excluded from the coverage of the
FAA because they do not sufficiently register intent or seriousness.
Consumer contracts formed over the Internet are the modern day
equivalent of non-written arbitration provisions in 1925. Both forms of
agreement are notable for the casual way in which they are formed and
their inability to impart seriousness or register choice. Accordingly,
arbitration provisions in consumer contracts formed over the Internet
should generally be excluded from the scope of the FAA.
A. Overview of the FAA's Limitation to Written Arbitration Provisions
Section 2, as noted, limits the FAA's coverage to written provisions.
Additionally, section 3 refers to the necessity of an "agreement in
writing" to arbitrate °4 and section 4 speaks of a "written agreement for
arbitration. '"10 5 Neither "writing" nor "written" are defined in the FAA.
Courts have required relatively little in the way of formality beyond the
existence of an arbitration provision embodied in written form. For
example, "the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that
no signature is required to meet the FAA's 'written' requirement."
1 6
Many courts have also indicated that the terms of the contract may be
included in multiple documents and need not be contained in a single
integrated writing. °7 And at least one court has held that the overall
contract need not be in writing, so long as the arbitration provision is in
writing. °8 Even a draft of an agreement may qualify as a written
agreement."" The lack of formalities beyond the written form, however,
should not be seen as diminishing the importance of the written form
104. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
105. Id. § 4.
106. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005); see
also Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that "it is
well-established that a party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate even absent a
signature," and that "while the [FAA] requires a writing, it does not require that the
writing be signed by the parties"); M & I Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Rapistan Demag Corp., 814
F. Supp. 545, 547 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ("Neither the [FAA] nor the courts require that written
agreements be signed or subscribed by the parties.").
107. Caley, 428 F.3d at 1369 (citing case law indicating that it is not necessary that
there be a single integrated writing); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth
Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that a "written
provision" under section 2 is not limited to "a contract completely integrated in a single
written agreement").
108. Durkin v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481, 487 (D. Kan. 1996)
(rejecting the argument that because the relevant employment agreement was at-will and
unwritten, the arbitration provision was not within section 2 of the FAA, and instead
holding that all that is necessary is that the arbitration provision itself be in writing).
109. Herlofson Mgmt. A/S v. Ministry of Supply, Kingdom of Jordan, 765 F. Supp. 78,
85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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limitation. To the contrary, it makes it all the more important that courts
be scrupulous with respect to the written form limitation, since that
limitation is the only form-based one in the statute.
B. Words on an Internet Website Are Text, but Not Written Text
1. Thinking About Electronically Displayed Text
Words displayed on an Internet website are text. They are not,
however, written text. We are at a transitional stage in how we think and
speak about on-screen text. It may have seemed, early on, like the
closest (or only) analogy to text on a screen was written text. Lacking a
sufficient vocabulary, we fell back on the familiar concept of writing. We
are now, however, becoming more comfortable speaking in different
ways about the act of "writing" electronically. "Texting"-sending
messages through a cell phone-is now ubiquitous,"0 as is "instant
messaging." If the problem is that we lack a word or phrase to describe
the text on an Internet website then let me propose "electronically
displayed text," as a more accurate way to describe on-screen text than as
"written."
Having said that, I readily concede that I "wrote" this Article, even
though I composed it entirely on a computer. Typing on a computer
keyboard is so similar to typing on a typewriter (which I am old enough
to have done) that to call this act anything but writing would be forced.
But how text is created is less important, in the consumer context, than
how it is received and perceived. An exchange of e-mails between
sophisticated business entities might be deemed both to have been
written and to be in writing. But even though the words on an Internet
website were probably "written" by their author, they are, when viewed
by a consumer, neither written nor in writing. In fact, they are no more
written or in writing than they would be if someone were to recite those
written terms verbally to a consumer over the phone. Text that has been
written can be read, it can be written, or it can be displayed
electronically. Text on an Internet website is displayed electronically. I
am not trying to denigrate electronically displayed text or to romanticize
written text. I am only pointing out that we are beginning to understand
that written text and electronically displayed text differ in important
ways. I discuss some differences between these types of text in the
following section.
110. See Alan Stewart, Text Messaging: WAN2TLK, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
2006 BOOK OF THE YEAR 165, 165 (Karen Jacobs Sparks ed. 2006) ("In 2005 some 45
billion text messages were expected to be sent by cellular phone users in the United
States.").
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2. Some Differences Between Written Contract Terms and
Electronically Displayed Contract Terms
In this part of the Article, I describe a number of differences between
written text on paper and electronically displayed text on a website. As I
will argue in Part III.C, these differences are relevant for purposes of the
FAA.
a. Materiality and Tangibility
The most obvious difference between written text on paper and
electronically displayed text on a website is that the former is in material
and tangible form. This characteristic is a key component of a writing.
An entry from a dictionary roughly contemporaneous with the passage of
the FAA begins the first definition of "writing" as follows: "The act or
art of forming letters and characters on paper, wood, stone, or other
material."'' . A portion of the first definition of "write" also conveys this
sense of materiality: "To set down, as legible characters; to form the
conveyance of meaning; to inscribe on any material by a suitable
instrument."1 '2
The word "written" is also understood in the commercial community
as incorporating an aspect of materiality. Although the UCC was not
officially promulgated until the 1950s, drafting began in 1940, relatively
close to the passage of the FAA.'13 The general definition of "writing"
adopted in the UCC hinges in large part on tangibility and provides that
"'written' or 'writing' includes printing, typewriting or any other
intentional reduction to tangible form.,
114
The revised version of the UCC retains that definition of "writing"
while adding a separate term, "record," that is sufficiently broad to
incorporate electronic documents. A "record" can be information that is
either "inscribed on a tangible medium" (in other words, a writing), or
information that is "stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form" (in other words, in electronic, and
presumably non-written, form)."' While "[a]ny 'writing' is a record,,
116
the converse is not true, and commercial law continues to recognize that
"writings" are tangible.
111. WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY 1669 (1913 ed.) (emphasis added).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code:
1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 277 (1998) (describing the history of the drafting of the
UCC).
114. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (2002) (amended 2003) (emphasis added).
115. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(31), § 9-102(a)(69) (2007).
116. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 9a.
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Consumer contracts formed on a website lack the materiality and
tangibility fundamental to a writing. While providing contract terms in a
material, tangible form has some potential to signal to the consumer that
important contract terms are contained within, providing contract terms
in a more ethereal form likely does not have this same impact.
Further, the sheer length of a contract is affected by the intangible
nature of electronically displayed text. Professor Vincent Gautrais notes
that "sellers who propose electronic contracts have a tendency to make
them very long.... When it comes to a "physical medium," like paper,
parties have at least two incentives to keep the contract terms to a
relative minimum: extensive terms give rise to a cumbersome multi-page
document, and they also give rise to higher publication costs. 118 In
contrast, "[i]n an electronic medium, there are no financial limitations in
making a document available to the public." '119 There is a difference
between an arbitration provision among ten short contract terms and one
among forty lengthy ones. Further, in the paper world we think in terms
of pages. A consumer presented with dozens of terms might begin to feel
some creeping concern and ask, "I wonder why this contract for a
computer is twelve pages long?" But on a website, even the longest
contract can be scrolled through in moments without the user realizing
just how many equivalent pages of text are whisking by.
Further, a paper contract is at least a self-contained universe and is, for
the most part, clearly a contract. There are exceptional cases in the
world of paper contracting, of course. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts identifies a number of different documents that are of
potential concern in that they have both a contractual and non-
contractual component: "baggage checks or automobile parking lot
tickets," as well as "invoices" and "instructions for use."12  For
provisions in such dual use documents to be binding, the consumer must
have reason to know that the document is contractual in nature. 22 But
the exception is the norm on a website. An Internet website is typically a
jumble of often distracting information and serves a number of different
purposes, leading Professor Russell Korobkin to describe the website
contract as a "uniquely modern analog of the claim check.' ' 22 Although
there may be something labeled "terms and conditions," the distinction




120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. d (1981).
121. Id.
122. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1268-69 (2003).
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between contract and non-contract is far from clear. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that there are as yet no "set standards regarding
the placement of contractual clauses" in electronic contracts.123
The durability of the medium containing text is also relevant. Paper is
not indestructible, of course, but after a transaction is complete a
consumer maintains a more or less permanent record of that to which the
consumer has agreed. Such retention sends a message. It signals a
consumer that the consumer has entered into a potentially important and
legally binding agreement.
Additionally, retention of the contract terms also provides the
opportunity for post-transaction review of the contract terms. Such post-
transaction review is potentially important. It provides a consumer with
the opportunity to review terms at the consumer's leisure, to have second
thoughts about a transaction (and possibly undo it through a return
option), or to decide not to deal with a particular seller in the future
based on those terms. It also enables a consumer to readily determine
the scope of the consumer's agreement if a dispute arises.
Electronically displayed text is theoretically permanent but, as a
practical matter, fleeting. That is, some server somewhere probably
records every key stroke and every contract term ever agreed upon. And
a consumer does have the opportunity to print up or store contract terms.
But the likelihood of that happening cannot be very high. From the
point of view of the consumer, once an "I accept" icon has been clicked,
the terms are gone from the consumer's life forever.
Whereas post-transaction retention of written contract terms signals
the importance of the transaction, the fleeting nature of a consumer
internet transaction sends just the opposite signal. Further, the benefits
of post-transaction retention described above are lost when the consumer
is not automatically provided with a material and tangible record of the
transaction.
b. Methods of Assent
The methods of assent in the world of paper contracting are fairly well
understood, whether such assent occurs through a symbolic act, such as
signing, or through conduct. Assent in the world of electronically
displayed text, usually registered through clicking on icons, is far less
understood.
Indeed, the concept of assent, already more theoretical than real in the
world of mass-market written contracts, is strained even further in the
world of online contracting which led Professor Charles Knapp to refer
to the standardized terms in electronic contracts as "[s]tandardized forms
123. Gautrais, supra note 117, at 196.
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on steroids.' ' 124 Professor Knapp observes that signing a written contract
tends to be a "one-time action" in the making of an individual contract
and thus both demonstrates that consent is being given and impresses on
the user the significance of the user's action. In contrast, "on-line
transactions typically involve a whole series of clickings and typings to
get from start to finish; whether any particular one of those has the kind
of symbolic significance equal to the signing of one's name on a
document seems .. . extremely dubious., 126  Additionally, Professors
Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski, although generally satisfied that
electronic contracting requires no special contract rules, have observed
that "e-consumers" may not fully appreciate the significance of a "mouse
click" as compared to the significance of signing their name on a piece of
127paper.
The ability of electronically displayed text in a consumer transaction to
impart a sense of seriousness is also impaired by the fact that consumers
typically go on-line as opposed to going to a brick and mortar store with
the hope and expectation of saving time.128 Professors Hillman and
Rachlinski note that, "[b]ecause of their relative youth and their frequent
use of the Internet to save time, e-consumers might be a little too eager
to complete their transactions. ,129 Such users "may not pay attention to
the legal concerns addressed in the boilerplate" and "have become
accustomed to speed and instant gratification when using the Internet."'3 °
And these users, described by Professors Hillman and Rachlinski as
"click-happy," may simply fail to investigate the standardized terms,
including any arbitration provisions, at all. The fact that consumers are
expecting a quick process (coupled with the anonymity of an online
transaction) also affects the extent to which the electronic contracting
process can and does register any sort of knowing or serious choice or
intent.
c. Consistency and Uniformity
A mass market written consumer contract will be consistent from
consumer to consumer. But this is not true of electronically displayed
124. Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
of Individual Contracts, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 95, 113 (2006).
125. Id. at 113 n.71.
126. Id.
127. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 481 (2002).
128. See Gautrais, supra note 117, at 196; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 127, at
479.
129. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 127, at 479.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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text. There are a number of variables as to how a consumer will view
text on a website. The size of the screen, the resolution, and the
browsing program will all affect how electronically displayed text will
appear to a consumer. Thus, contract terms viewed on a 21-inch monitor
may convey some sense of seriousness. Terms viewed on a tiny mobile
device may convey instead only a sense of informality and casualness.
Further, one concern in general when it comes to standardized terms is
that sellers of consumer goods and services will expend considerable
resources to determine how to present arbitration provisions in a way
that these provisions will not be fully registered or appreciated by the
consumer.32 A website provides almost infinite possibility for this type
of mischief. Sellers on a website have a large number of ways in which
they can highlight or downplay an arbitration provision -everything
from the use of hypertext links to the means of navigating the website-
that are not available in the world of paper contracting. Consider, for
example, that research suggests that when it comes to navigating text on
a screen, "[p]aging is apparently superior to scrolling in terms of both
performance and user preference. One advantage of paging is that
incidental memory for location within a page may facilitate
processing." '33 Readers can conduct their own surveys, but I have found
that websites invariably present standardized terms through a scrolling
device, not through paging. Apparently, sellers have decided to use the
more disorienting and less effective method for delivering contract terms,
including arbitration provisions.
I am not arguing that electronically displayed text cannot be treated
the same way as written text for many purposes. But written text and
electronically displayed text are not the same. Whether electronically
displayed text should be treated like written text depends on whether the
differences between them are relevant in a given context. I argue in Part
III.C that the differences are relevant in the context of the FAA's
limitation to written arbitration. I argue as well that consumer Internet
contracting is the equivalent of oral contracting in 1925-it is the current
"bottom of the barrel" of contracting seriousness and should be excluded
from the coverage of the FAA.
132. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1648-49 (2005) ("Some companies may even deliberately design their
arbitration clauses in a manner geared to decrease the likelihood that the consumer will
focus on the arbitration clause.").
133. Paul Muter, Interface Design and Optimization of Reading of Continuous Text, in
COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC TEXT PROCESSING 161, 169 (Herre van
Oostendorp & Sjaak de Mul eds., 1996) (internal citations omitted).
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3. In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation
One court has assessed whether "written" in section 2 includes
electronically displayed text. In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation
is the only case of which I am aware that directly discusses whether
"written" in section 2 includes electronically displayed text.1 4 Given the
number of electronic contracts, this paucity of cases might seem odd. It
is presumably the result of two things. First, the proliferation of
electronic contracting (especially in the consumer context) is a relatively
recent phenomenon. And, second, courts seem to have assumed that E-
SIGN resolved the issue (although I argue to the contrary).'35 Because E-
SIGN was passed in 2000, there was a narrow span of time within which
the issue would have been deemed relevant. RealNetworks fell within
that span.1
3 6
RealNetworks was a class action suit in which the court assessed the
enforceability of an arbitration provision that appeared on users'
computer screens before the users could download a software package
over the Internet."' The court considered the argument that "[b]ecause
the terms in the [FAA] must be given their plain meaning and do not
explicitly allow for an 'electronic' agreement . . . an electronic
communication cannot satisfy the writing requirement, but only a written
one can."
138
The court rejected this argument. The court looked to definitions of
"writing," "write," and "written" in dictionaries that were roughly
contemporaneous with the passage of the FAA.139  For example, the
court noted that the 1913 Webster's Dictionary (to which I referred above
in my discussion of materiality and the definition of "written" 140) defined
"writing" in part as "[t]he act or art of forming letters or characters on
134. In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-C-1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *2-3
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000). Some courts have concluded that arbitration agreements in
electronic form are "written" for purposes of the FAA without any meaningful discussion
of the issue (and without any mention of E-SIGN). See, e.g., Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court,
495 F.3d 1062, 1065-67 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (apparently concluding that an arbitration
provision posted on an Internet website was "written" because the court applied the
FAA); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 603-04, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(same).
135. See discussion infra Part IV.
136. RealNetworks was decided on May 8, 2000. RealNetworks, 2000 WL 631341, at
*1-2. This was less than two months before E-SIGN was signed into law on June 30, 2000.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114
Stat. 464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2000)).
137. RealNetworks, 2000 WL 631341, at *1.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *2-3.
140. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.a.
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paper, wood, stone, or other material" to record or communicate ideas.'4 1
The court was satisfied from the dictionary definitions it cited that
"'written' does not exclude all electronic communications."'42 The court
never explained what the relevant "material" is in an electronic contract,
thus ignoring the feature of materiality that distinguishes written text
from other types of text.
43
Moreover, the court's holding is limited. The court merely held that
"'written' [in section 2] does not exclude all electronic
communications ' 44 (a conclusion with which I agree, since e-mails
between sophisticated parties may, under some circumstances, properly
be viewed as "written" under the FAA). The court explicitly stated that
it was not finding that all electronic communications should be




The court was persuaded that the on-screen arbitration provision
should be considered written because of the "easily printable and
storable nature" of the license agreement containing the arbitration
provision.'4 The court brushed aside as "melodrama" arguments
regarding the difficulty of saving and printing the license agreement in
the absence of a clearly marked "save" or "print" icon. 147 First, the court
noted, "the user can right click his mouse over the text of the License
Agreement, select all, and copy and paste it onto any word processing
program.' 48 The court continued, with some sarcasm: "Since using the
right click function is too specialized for Intervenor, he even has the
option to simply click and drag the cursor over the text of the License
Agreement in order to highlight it and then copy and paste the License
Agreement onto any word processing program.' 49  Additionally, the
court advised that since the license agreement is automatically
downloaded and saved to the user's hard drive, "the user can then click
on the License Agreement, listed separately as either 'RealJukeBox
License Agreement' or 'RealPlayer License Agreement,' depending on
the product, and easily print out either agreement from the file pull down
menu."'5° To me, none of that sounds quite as likely to occur as the court
141. RealNetworks, 2000 WL 631341, at *2 (quoting WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY (1913)).
142. Id.
143. See supra Part II.B.2.
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seems to assume. The words and letters floating around in cyberspace
are capable of being reduced to a material form (just as is spoken
language or text appearing on a television screen during a commercial),
but even casual users of computers know electronically displayed text is
quite unlikely to ever actually be put in material form by a consumer.
Further, the court's assessment of the ease and likelihood of printing
seems to be premised on a world of desktop computers hooked up to
printers. That was a reasonable premise to be working under in 2000.
But since 2000 we have seen a switch from desktops to laptops (which are
by definition mobile and thus not invariably attached to a printer), as
well as the proliferation of handheld devices through which the Internet
can be accessed.' The likelihood of saving and printing has probably
decreased markedly since RealNetworks was decided as we have moved
away from the paradigm of a desktop computer hooked up to a printer.
Additionally, the court should have focused on the purpose underlying
the restriction of the FAA's coverage to "written" agreements. 12 That
purpose should dictate whether a given electronic communication is
"written" or not for purposes of the FAA. I discuss that purpose in more
detail in the following section.
C. The Purpose of the Written Limitation
1. Critique of the "Statute of Frauds" Approach
In the view of some relatively recent courts and commentators, the
FAA's limitation to written arbitration provisions was intended to ensure
that only sufficiently evidenced agreements be enforced-in other words,
"to protect parties who never agreed to arbitrate from dissembling
151. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
152. The court also arguably erred in a third way. When limiting state power to
legislate, courts must be "absolutely certain" that Congress intended to extend its power
into an area traditionally reserved to the states. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464
(1991); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at
1175-76 (3d ed. 2000) ("[The Court] require[es] that decisions restricting state sovereignty
be made in a deliberate manner by Congress, through the explicit exercise of its
lawmaking power to that end."). Consumer protection and the regulation of contracts are
two such areas. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 99, 156 (2006) (noting that "contract law, including consumer protection" is a "core
area" that is "typically within the province of the states"). Justice Thomas has stated that
in the absence of such certainty, the scope of the FAA should not be expanded. See
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292-93 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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adversaries." '153  The "written provision" language has thus been
described as something akin to "arbitration's 'own peculiar and special'
statute of frauds."'' 4 Courts seem simply to be looking for evidence that
memorializes an agreement to arbitrate.' As one court put it,
"evidentiary concerns" underlie the FAA's limitation to writings: "the
requirement of a writing is intended to permit enforcement of arbitration
agreements only in the face of competent evidence of the agreement's
existence and scope."' 56 But these recent courts and commentators are
assigning to the written limitation a role that it was likely not intended to
serve.
In general, the "primary purpose" of a writing in a statute of frauds is
"evidentiary, to require reliable evidence of the existence and terms of
the contract and prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury.,1 7 But
the statute of frauds is the wrong analogy here. The writing limitation in
the FAA is not designed merely to evidence intent. Instead, the
limitation is designed to register intent.
First, the structure and language of the FAA show that something
other than a statute of frauds was intended. A typical statute of frauds
requires only that there be some evidence of an agreement-that the• • 158
agreement or a "memorandum or note" of it be in writing. The writingneed not be the complete contract 59-it is enough that the memorandum
153. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy,
Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 182 (1999)
(arguing that the "written" limitation is not needed to protect these parties).
154. 1 MARTIN DOMKE, GABRIEL WILNER & LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 9:1, at 9-4 (3d ed. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Davis,
supra note 153, at 182 (characterizing the limitation to written agreements as a "Statute of
Frauds").
155. See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an employee handbook providing for arbitration, along with letter from an
employee requesting to proceed with the process outlined in the handbook, constituted "a
writing memorializing an agreement to arbitrate" and hence satisfied the section 2
"written" requirement).
156. Durkin v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481,487 (D. Kan. 1996); see also
Davis, supra note 153, at 182 (arguing that if a litigant admits under oath that he entered
into an arbitration agreement, there is no reason the agreement should not be enforced).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 cmt. c (1981); see also
Consolidation Servs., Inc. v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 185 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The
principal purpose of the statute of frauds is evidentiary."); Elec. Wholesalers, Inc. v.
M.J.B. Corp., 912 A.2d 1117, 1123 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) ("The primary purpose of the
statute of frauds is to provide reliable evidence of the existence and the terms of the
contract .... " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158. 10 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 29:1, at 426 (4th ed. 1999).
159. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 74(A), at 378 (4th
ed. 2001) ("The typical American statute of frauds does not require the writing evidencing
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reasonably identifies the contract's subject matter, indicates a contract
has been made, and "set[s] forth the essential terms of the contract with
reasonable certainty."' 6
The FAA is structured differently. First, section 2 makes clear that the
arbitration provision itself must be in writing.161 Sections 3 and 4 clarify
further that the writing is not merely evidence of the agreement but
rather is the agreement itself. Section 3 refers to the necessity of an
"agreement in writing" to arbitrate, 62 and section 4 speaks of a "written
agreement for arbitration.' ' 63 The writing is not treated as evidence of
the fact of an agreement. Instead, the writing is the agreement to be
enforced by the court.'64 The very lack of a signature requirement shows
that something other than a statute of frauds was intended. The FAA's
applicability only to written agreements is not a statute of frauds
designed to evidence a transaction and it should not be treated as such.
2. Registering Choice and Imparting Seriousness
If the FAA's "written" limitation is not intended to serve a primarily
evidentiary function, then what is its purpose? There are not many clues.
The statute does not define "written" or "writing." Professor Paul
Sayre, writing nearly contemporaneously with the passage of the FAA,
could discern "no useful purpose" for the limitation of coverage of the
165FAA to written agreements. Nonetheless, the clues that do exist show
that the written limitation is not one to be taken lightly and is intended to
register a choice and to impart the seriousness of the contract term at
issue.
Interestingly, the first draft of the FAA did not limit its coverage to
written agreements, and instead included oral agreements within the
scope of the FAA.66 Congress therefore presumably contemplated but
rejected this extremely broad scope for the FAA. The "written"
the contract to be intended by the parties as their complete or final statement of the
contract. A memorandum of the contract will be sufficient.").
160. Id. § 74(B); cf U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2002) (amended 2003) ("A writing [evidencing
a sale of goods] is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed
upon").
161. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
162. Id. § 3.
163. Id. § 4.
164. See id. (providing that arbitration is enforced according to the terms of the
written agreement to arbitrate).
165. Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595,
613 (1928).
166. See MACNEIL, supra note 28, at 85.
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• • .. 167
limitation was consciously added to the legislation, indicating that
Congress had in mind that arbitration provisions would only be enforced
if something beyond the most basic and informal means of contracting
was utilized by the parties.
The legislative history of the FAA gives some indication that the
writing proviso was designed to ensure that only agreements in which the
parties were registering a careful choice to select arbitration would be
covered by the FAA. The Senate Report accompanying the bill, for
instance, refers to the "justice ... [of enforcing] arbitration of disputes
where written agreements for that purpose have been voluntarily and
solemnly entered into."' '
Contemporaneous commentary also supports the proposition that the
"written" limitation was intended to have real significance. A law review
article co-authored by Julius Henry Cohen, who was one of the principal
drafters of the FAA'69 and one of its most significant proponents, notes
that "[a]rbitration under the [FAA] depends upon a written
instrument.''. The writing thus serves as the parties' mechanism for
choosing arbitration under the FAA. Further, Cohen's use of the word
"instrument" is telling. "Instrument" connotes some degree of
seriousness and materiality. Indeed, even as Article 9 of the UCC
recognizes that many types of documents need not be in written form,72
it continues to require that to satisfy the Article 9 definition of
"instrument," a document must be "written" (i.e., in tangible form).'73
Cohen's article goes on to liken arbitration clauses to "the promissory
note, the bond and mortgage, or the will"' 74-hardly examples of
informal documents or documents that merely contain evidence of an
agreement. A person signing a will or agreeing to a promissory note,
bond, or mortgage is likely to understand that he is agreeing to a very
specific (and serious) kind of a transaction or arrangement, something
akin to a transfer of a property right. Entering into such an agreement
registers a serious level of intent.
167. The language, which had not been included in the 1921 draft of the legislation,
was included in the 1922 draft. See id. at 87.
168. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924).
169. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,274 (1995).
170. See Moses, supra note 152, at 101-13 (discussing Julius Cohen's role in the passage
of the FAA).
171. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 28, at 281.
172. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 9a (2007) ("In many, but not all, instances, the term
'record' replaces the term 'writing' and 'written."').
173. Id. § 9-102(a)(47) (defining "instrument" to mean "a negotiable instrument or
any other writing" that meets the remainder of the definition).
174. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 28, at 281.
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Similarly, Professor Wesley Sturges, who has been described as the
"leading writer on the arbitration statutes," 175 observed in a 1928 law
review article discussing the FAA and various similar state statutes: "It
should not be overlooked that the statutes which embrace future-
disputes clauses ...are predicated upon a written agreement of the
parties. They do not 'compel' arbitration in absence of such
agreement." '176 The writing limitation thus appears to be designed to
register choice, not merely to evidence it.
Satisfying the requirements of an arbitration statute also registers a
choice in a somewhat different sense-a choice to proceed pursuant to
statutory arbitration as opposed to common law arbitration. In a law
review article by Professor Sturges and a student co-author, Richard
Reckson, the authors note that state statutes similar to the FAA were not
intended to displace common law arbitration.177 Instead, these statutes
simply added a second method of arbitration; parties are free to choose
one or the other."' How is that choice exercised? According to the
authors:
The parties' first step in exercising their choice is of course their
consummation of their arbitration agreement. If that
agreement does not meet the statutory requirements generally
it will not engage the statute. If they accomplish an arbitration
agreement which does qualify under the statute it seems best to
conclude that they have elected to arbitrate under the statute
179
The article notes that "as the parties' agreement is the very warrant for
their arbitration both at common law and under the statutes, so should
their agreement be deemed the initial indicator in each case whether they
have undertaken arbitration at common law or under the statute."' ° In
other words, compliance with the formal specifications in the statute is to
be taken as a way of signaling a choice to proceed under a statute,
instead of the common law.'8 '
175. Halvorson Mason Corp. v. Emerick Constr. Co., 745 P.2d 1221,1224 (Or. 1987).
176. Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration Under the New North Carolina Arbitration
Statute- The Uniform Arbitration Act, 6 N.C. L. REV. 363, 370 n.7 (1928).
177. Wesley A. Sturges & Richard E. Reckson, Common-Law and Statutory
Arbitration: Problems Arising From Their Coexistence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 819, 826 (1962)
("There is near consensus of American decisions on the precise point that the arbitration
statutes of the different jurisdictions do not displace common-law arbitration.").
178. See id. at 830.
179. Id. (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 830-31.
181. See Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration Under the New Pennsylvania Arbitration
Statute, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 345, 350 (1928) (noting that, with respect to the writing
requirement in the Pennsylvania arbitration statute, an agreement in writing gives rise to
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In sum, Congress could have made the FAA applicable to all contracts,
whether written or not, but chose not to do so. Instead, Congress
determined that the most informal of methods of contract formation-
oral-would not suffice to trigger the application of the FAA. A
consumer contract formed on-line does not sufficiently register choice or
convey formality and seriousness; it should not trigger the application
of the FAA.
Further, given that the Court has held that state law can impose no
enhanced notice requirements on arbitration provisions,"' and given that
section 2 imposes no formality beyond a written form, the "written"
limitation is the only mechanism available to provide any sort of
consumer protection under the FAA. It should, accordingly, be enforced
with diligence.
IV. E-SIGN AND THE FAA "WRIITEN" LIMITATION
The FAA casts a shadow over state efforts to regulate arbitration.
E-SIGN, in turn, casts its own shadow over efforts to regulate electronic
commerce. In this section of the Article, I focus on E-SIGN. While I
acknowledge strong arguments that E-SIGN requires that "written" in
the FAA be read to include all electronically displayed text, I take a
contrary position.
In Part IV.A, I provide a brief overview of E-SIGN and a brief
discussion of the argument that E-SIGN mandates that "written" in the
FAA include all electronically displayed text (an argument with which I
disagree). In Part IV.B, I describe the crucial and relevant ways in which
Internet access has changed since the passage of E-SIGN in 2000.
Finally, in Part IV.C, I advance a number of arguments as to why
E-SIGN does not invariably require that "written" in the FAA be read to
include all electronically displayed text.
A. Overview of E-SIGN
E-SIGN was enacted in 2000."4 The Act provides in part that for
transactions in interstate commerce:
an inference of intent to proceed under statutory arbitration and an agreement not in
writing gives rise to an inference of intent to proceed under common law arbitration
rules).
182. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
183. See discussion supra Part llB.
184. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
229, 114 Stat. 464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2000)). For a discussion and
analysis of E-SIGN, see generally Mike Watson, Comment, E-Commerce and E-Law; Is
Everything E-Okay? Analysis of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 803 (2001).
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(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to [an interstate] transaction may not
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because
an electronic signature or electronic record was used in itsformation.98
States have the ability to modify these provisions, subject to some
fairly stringent constraints: the states may either adopt the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act' (UETA) or provide alternate procedures
or requirements that meet certain guidelines set forth in E-SIGN .
The purposes of E-SIGN, according to the House Judiciary Committee
Report accompanying the bill, are:
(1) to permit and encourage the continued expansion of
electronic commerce through the operation of free market
forces rather than proscriptive governmental mandates and
regulations;
(2) to promote public confidence in the validity, integrity,
and reliability of electronic commerce and online government
under Federal law;
(3) to facilitate and promote electronic commerce by
clarifying the legal status of electronic records and electronic
signatures in the context of writing and signing requirements
imposed by law;
(4) to facilitate the ability of private parties engaged in
interstate transactions to agree among themselves on the terms
and conditions on which they use and accept electronic
signatures and electronic records; and
(5) to promote the development of a consistent national legal
infrastructure necessary to support electronic commerce at the
Federal and State levels within existing areas of jurisdiction.'
8
There are strong arguments that E-SIGN requires that "written" and
"writing" in the FAA be read to include all electronic contracts. To the
extent that an arbitration provision in a consumer Internet contract is
pushed outside of the scope of enforceability because it is in electronic
and not written form, E-SIGN would seem to be implicated. Further,
185. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000).
186. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7A U.L.A. 225 (2002).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 7002.
188. H.R. REP. No. 106-341, pt. 2, at 2-3 (1999).
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some commentators have urged that E-SIGN was designed to create
"parity" between electronic and written documents." 9
As an initial matter, I note that it is not entirely clear how the concept
of "parity" plays out when it comes to legislation like the Proposed State
Arbitration Law. States clearly have the ability to regulate arbitration
provisions in written contracts in intrastate commerce, 9' and a state can
mandate that such arbitration provisions be conspicuous.19 1 The
Proposed State Arbitration Law is such legislation. The Proposed State
Arbitration Law does create parity-it treats electronic arbitration
agreements in consumer transactions the exact same way that it treats all
written arbitration agreements in intrastate consumer transactions.
Nonetheless, there seems to be something approaching consensus that
E-SIGN requires that "written" in the FAA be read to include electronic
contracts. Indeed, Professor Jean Braucher has stated that E-SIGN was
largely intended to foreclose a narrow interpretation of "written" in the
FAA.'9 Professor Braucher has argued that the "need to make
electronic contracts enforceable," the supposed purpose of E-SIGN, was
really just a "cover story" for various interested industries and trade
groups.'93 According to Professor Braucher, one of the true purposes of
these industries and trade groups in pushing for E-SIGN and UETA was
to insure that courts not use the "written" language of the FAA as a
simple way to avoid enforcement of arbitration provisions."'
At least two courts have interpreted E-SIGN as requiring "written" in
the FAA to include electronic contracts, although interestingly each
court displayed ambivalence towards electronic contracting by ultimately
refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement before it. In Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit assessed an arbitration provision in a software license
agreement provided to users in downloadable electronic form.'9 The
189. Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under the
Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 297-98 (2000) (discussing
how E-SIGN creates parity between electronic and non-electronic signatures and
documents).
190. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (limiting the scope of the FAA to transactions in interstate
commerce).
191. Cf Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("The FAA ...
displaces the Montana [notice] statute with respect to arbitration agreements covered by
the Act." (emphasis added)).
192. See Jean Braucher, Rent-Seeking and Risk-Fixing in the New Statutory Law of




195. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
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court noted that "the parties [did] not dispute, nor could they," that the
arbitration agreement was a "'written provision' despite being provided
to users in a downloadable electronic form."' ' 6 The matter, according to
the court, "ha[d] been settled by" E-SIGN.197
Similarly, in Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit assessed an
arbitration agreement that had been provided to employees of General
Dynamics through e-mail.9 8  When a former employee sued the
company, alleging that his firing had violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), General Dynamics argued that the arbitration
agreement barred the lawsuit.199 The former employee opposed General
Dynamic's motion to compel arbitration by arguing, first, that the "e-
mail communication [containing the arbitration provision was] not a
writing and, therefore, ...did not satisfy the 'written provision"' of
section 2 of the FAA; and second, that the e-mail failed to give adequate
notice of the arbitration agreement.200 The Court held that E-SIGN
definitively resolves the issue . .. as to whether an e-mail
agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable under the FAA
because it does not satisfy the FAA's "written provision"
requirement. By its plain terms, the E-S[IGN] Act prohibits
any interpretation of the FAA's "written provision" that would
preclude giving legal effect to an agreement solely on the basis
that it was in electronic form. °1
However, after concluding that E-SIGN requires that "written" be
read to include contracts in electronic form, the respective courts in each
of these cases went on to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement at
issue. And the refusal was, in both cases, for reasons directly related to
the electronic format in which the respective arbitration agreements were
presented. In Specht, the court determined that a "reasonably prudent"
offeree would not have known of the license terms that included the
arbitration provision.202 The contractual nature of the website was not
obvious, and computer users would have to have scrolled down on the
computer screen to see the terms-something which they had no
particular reason to do.2°3 The court concluded that "where consumers
are urged to download free software at the immediate click of a button, a
196. Id. at 26 n.11.
197. Id.
198. Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 556 (1st Cir. 2005).
199. Id. at 549.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 556 (citations omitted).
202. Specht, 306 F.3d at 30.
203. Id. at 31-32.
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reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not
sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those
terms."2°  Despite the court's assertion that E-SIGN mandated a
conclusion that the arbitration provision was a "written provision" even
though in electronic form, the court refused to enforce the agreement for
reasons directly relating to that electronic format. As the court noted,
the transactional circumstances at issue could not "be fully analogized to
those in the paper world of arm's-length bargaining. '"2 5
In Campbell the court also found the arbitration provision at issue
unenforceable. As in Specht, the court's reasons for refusing to enforce
the agreement were directly related to the very nature of the electronic
communication. The court noted that the enforceability of an agreement
to arbitrate an ADA claim is determined by "whether, under the totality
of the circumstances, the employer's communications to its employees
afforded 'some minimal level of notice' sufficient to apprise those
employees that continued employment would effect a waiver of the right
to pursue the claim in [court]." 2°6 The court described this burden as
"relatively light., 20m  However, the court held that the e-mail
communication at issue in Campbell did not meet that burden. The court
noted that it could "easily . . . envision circumstances in which a
straightforward e-mail, explicitly delineating an arbitration agreement,"
could provide the requisite notice . But the court went on to observe
that although e-mail was used for all manner of intracompany
communication, the record did not "suggest that e-mail was a traditional
means either for conveying contractually binding terms or for
effectuating waivers of employees' legal rights.' '209 Thus, both Specht and
Campbell demonstrate that E-SIGN does not prohibit consequences
from flowing from the fact that a communication or document is in
electronic form, nor does E-SIGN shield any particular electronic format
from scrutiny.
B. Internet Access Has Changed Dramatically in Relevant Respects Since
E-SIGN Was Enacted
E-SIGN made considerable sense given the prevailing assumptions
about Internet access that existed at the time of E-SIGN's passage in
2000. The basic paradigm was of a computer user sitting in front of a
204. Id. at 32.
205. Id.
206. Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 555-56.
209. Id. at 557. The court also noted that the communication required no response
from the employee to indicate receipt. Id. at 556-57.
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desktop computer that was attached to a printer and a monitor. And the
screens on those monitors were both improving in resolution and
growing in size. For instance, in the mid- to late-1990s, monitor sizes
were increasing, with fourteen-inch monitors giving way to larger
seventeen-and nineteen-inch screens.21° Laptops existed, of course, but
wireless Internet access was comparatively rare, so that a person
accessing the Internet was almost certainly sitting at a desk. In this
environment, analogizing the Internet to the printed world was quite
logical. First, the screens were impressively large (and growing).
Second, accessing the Internet usually involved the seriousness of sitting
at a desk. And third, the presumed access to a printer made creating a
material and permanent document a simple and relatively easy-to-
exercise option.
Even before the ink was dry on E-SIGN (or the pixels were
formulated), the technological environment began to change rapidly, and
in ways that put the basic premises of E-SIGN under serious pressure.
While desktop computers dominated the market at the time E-SIGN was
passed in 2000, by 2005 laptop and notebook computers were outselling
desktop computers on a consistent basis,21  and the gap has only grown
212since. Mobile computing generally means smaller screens and
significantly reduced access to a printer.
Additionally, the tail end of the twentieth century saw the introduction
of a number of new devices for accessing the Internet that were quite
different from the traditional desktop computer. One, introduced in
1998, was a telephone (landline, not cellular) through which the Internet
could be accessed.213  Its screen was only 7.4 inches, and was not of
particularly good quality.214 It was one marker, however, in the beginning
of a trend.
The Internet can now be accessed through an astonishing array of
devices. In late June, 2007, Apple introduced a cell phone with a small
210. Andy Santoni, Monitor Suppliers Shifting to Larger Screen Sizes, INFOWORLD,
Sept. 15, 1997, at 31, 31.
211. Jonathan Sidener, Lapping the Competition, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 25,
2005, at El (reporting that laptop sales increased from approximately forty-three percent
of the retail market for computers in the second quarter of 2004 to approximately fifty-two
percent of the market in the second quarter of 2005).
212. See Jay Greene & Cliff Edwards, Desktops Are So Twentieth Century, BUS. WK.,
Dec. 18, 2006, at 46, 46 (noting that for the twelve-month period ending in October, 2006,
desktop sales dropped five percent while sales of laptops increased by thirty-five percent).
213. Howard Millman, iPhone Easy to Grasp but Weak in Screen Quality,
INFOWORLD, Mar. 16, 1998, at 92, 92. To avoid confusion, I note that this device
introduced in the late 1990s had an identical name-iPhone-to a different device
introduced to much fanfare at the time of the writing of this Article-the Apple iPhone.
214. Id.
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screen through which the Internet could be accessed.215  Apple's cell
phone, the iPhone, joined a number of other handheld devices that could
access the Internet.2 6 And a "new category of ultra-mini PCs . .. is
threatening to make computers as portable as cell phones.,217
Further, in the late 1990's, the technology behind what were then
known as "cellular modems" (through which the Internet can be
accessed wirelessly) was still in its infancy.2 " The earliest such modem
was introduced in 1995.219 In the late 1990s, although the technology was
improving, these devices were still "limited by technological drawbacks"
such as the lack of standards for wireless data transmission, a high power
220
consumption rate for the modems, and slow transmission speeds.
In contrast to the state of affairs in the late 1990s, wireless Internet
access is now ubiquitous and is being offered for free in a number of
places (and projections show within a decade, half the country will have
221
access to free wireless Internet service). It may be that in the late
1990's the Internet was replicating the written world as its model. In
2008, the model is probably that of a cell phone (or something sui
generis). The ability to store and print documents is no longer a central
feature of the Internet experience, and the likelihood that documents in
the context of consumer contracts will be reduced to hard copy is
probably relatively small (and almost certainly decreasing).
Other trends that affect how consumers view electronic text were also
only in their infancy at the time E-SIGN was drafted. The practice of
"texting" through a cell phone did not take off in the United States until
after 1998, and its popularity has grown enormously and very quickly. 2
This now ubiquitous form of communication, occurring on the very
phones through which users will increasingly access websites on the
Internet, is surely affecting the way consumers view "text" in cyberspace.
Neither of the two previously discussed cases in which the court held
that E-SIGN applied to the FAA's "written" limitation had any need to
215. See Apple, iPhone Technical Specifications, http://www.apple.com/iphone/
specs.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
216. Readers can view any one of a number of manufacturers' websites to find an
array of devices. See, e.g., Palm, Products, http://www.palm.comus/products/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008) (listing several phones, hand held devices, and small computers that can be
used for web browsing).
217. Lev Grossman, The Hyperconnected, TIME, Apr. 16, 2007, at 54, 56.
218. CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS, ET AL., HISTORY OFTHE INTERNET 221 (1999).
219. Id.
220. Id. (describing the state of affairs in 1997).
221. Grossman, supra note 217, at 56.
222. Stewart, supra note 110, at 165. In June of 2001, approximately thirty million text
messages were sent in the United States; in 2003, fourteen billion were sent; in 2004,
twenty-five billion were sent; and in 2005, an estimated forty-five billion were sent. Id.
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take into account the technological shift that has occurred since
E-SIGN's passage. The complaint in Specht was filed in mid-2000, at the
very height of the paradigm on which E-SIGN was based.2 3 Similarly,
the relevant e-mail communication in Campbell occurred in early 2001
(and in a workplace setting). In other words, the assumptions
underlying E-SIGN were still valid in each of these two cases. But those
assumptions no longer hold true.
Congress acted precipitously, legislating based on a paradigm that was
already beginning to recede and give way to the next one as E-SIGN was
promulgated. By waiting, Congress could have permitted the states to
try different approaches to dealing with issues raised by electronic
contracting and changes in technology. 22' Further, "[w]aiting would also
have allowed e-commerce to develop, both giving free rein to
nonlegislative solutions and clearly identifying whatever problems
remained., 226  This does not, of course, mean that E-SIGN can be
ignored.
However, it does mean that Congress should reconsider some aspects
of E-SIGN, including the range of E-SIGN's applicability. Congress did
explicitly except certain types of contracts from E-SIGN's coverage.
227
The exceptions are to be revisited by the Secretary of Commerce.22' For
example, the statute excepts from E-SIGN's coverage contracts governed
by statutes or laws governing the "creation and execution of wills,,,229
codicils, or testamentary trusts,' contracts governed by statutes or laws
governing various matters of family law,230 and contracts governed by
UCC provisions on negotiable instruments and secured transactions.23
The seriousness of arbitration provisions and the importance of the
"written" limitation in the FAA make contracts under the FAA a logical
and appropriate exception from E-SIGN's coverage, as well.
223. See Class Action Complaint at 1, Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F.
Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00 Civ. 4871), 2000 WL 34500748 (complaint filed on
June 30, 2000).
224. Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 547-48 (1st Cir. 2005).
225. See Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in
Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REv. 309, 361 (2002) ("Perhaps, given time, the courts and the
state legislatures would have settled on a single successful formula for dealing with
electronic signatures.").
226. Id. at 362.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 7003 (2000).
228. Id. § 7003(c)(1).
229. Id. § 7003(a)(1).
230. Id. § 7003(a)(2).
231. Id. § 7003(a)(3) (exempting from E-SIGN all sections of the UCC except for
those relating to sales and leases of goods).
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Beyond providing a reason for an outright amendment of E-SIGN, the
shifting technological paradigm also counsels that courts should be very
cautious in applying E-SIGN where its applicability is uncertain. In the
next section I turn to a number of arguments as to why courts should not
interpret E-SIGN to mean that "written" in the FAA must include
electronically displayed text in consumer Internet transactions.
C. E-SIGN Does Not Mandate That Electronically Displayed Text on a
Website Be Deemed "Written" for Purposes of the FAA
In this section of the Article, I present three arguments that E-SIGN
does not mandate that electronically displayed text on a website be
deemed "written" for purposes of the FAA. The first argument deals
with the scope of E-SIGN; the second argument deals with the proper
application of E-SIGN; and the third argument deals with the consumer
protection provisions of E-SIGN.
1. The FAA Does Not Require a "Writing"
E-SIGN appears to apply only to "requirement[s] that contracts or
other records be written, signed, or in nonelectronic form., 23 2 The FAA's
limitation to written arbitration provisions is not such a requirement. On
first blush, the statement that the FAA does not require a writing may
seem strange. It may seem strange on all subsequent blushes, as well.
But the FAA no more requires a writing than it requires an arbitration
provision be in interstate commerce. There are consequences, of course,
that flow from whether a provision is in writing or not (just as there are
consequences that flow from whether a provision is in an interstate as
opposed to an intrastate transaction). An arbitration provision that is
written and in interstate commerce is within the scope of section 2. It is
subject to enforcement if it passes scrutiny under a limited range of state
laws-i.e., those grounds that exist under state law "for the revocation of
any contract, 233 which, as noted, includes things like duress, fraud, and
unconscionability.] But if an arbitration provision is not in writing, or
not in interstate commerce, it is not rendered unenforceable. Instead, it
is outside the scope of the FAA and is simply subject to a fuller panoply
of state law. Its enforceability will be decided according to that state
law.
235
232. Id. § 7001(b)(1) (2000).
233. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
234. See discussion supra Part II.B.
235. Cf. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1995) (noting
that by adopting a broader interpretation of the language in section 2, the Court was
declining to "carv[e] out an important statutory niche in which a State remains free to
apply its antiarbitration law or policy"); Chung v. President Enters., Corp., 943 F.2d 225,
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The "written" and "interstate" limitations are like a switch on a
railroad track. If the arbitration agreement is both in writing and in
interstate commerce, it heads down one track towards potential
enforcement. If it is not in writing or not in interstate commerce, it heads
down a different track. Indeed, to the extent that the "written" proviso is
designed to draw the line between the state sphere and the federal
sphere of regulation, the "written" limitation is not a requirement at all,
but merely a form of federalism calibration, and therefore not affected
by E-SIGN.
There are a number of analogous situations in which a writing is not
required and yet the existence of a writing still has consequences. For
instance, section 2-316 of the UCC describes how to exclude the implied
warranty of merchantability: "to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous. 2 36 Section
2-316 does not require that a disclaimer be in writing, but there is a
consequence to a disclaimer being in written form-it will only be
enforced if it is conspicuous. Similarly, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act (MMWA),237 provides that if a seller of consumer goods provides a
written warranty about the goods, then a number of consequences
follow. For instance, a supplier of a consumer good offering a written
warranty must adequately describe and designate the warranty offered,238
and is restricted in its ability to disclaim or limit certain warranties.239
Although there are consequences that flow from offering a written
warranty, the MMWA does not require a writing.24° A court could find,
of course, that a statement on a website is a "writing" for purposes of the
MMWA.241  However, the matter would not be resolved by E-SIGN,
rather it would be resolved by assessing the purpose of the rule in the
MMWA. 42
229 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that because the arbitration clause was written, in interstate
commerce, and a valid agreement, federal law, and not New York law, applied).
236. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2002) (amended 2003).
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
238. Id. § 2303(a).
239. Id. § 2308.
240. See 2 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES § 16.1 (2d ed. 2002) ("The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ... does not
require any business to offer a written warranty on a consumer product. Once the
decision is made to offer a written warranty, however, it must comply with the [MMWA's]
designation and substantive requirements.").
241. See, e.g., In re McDonald's French Fries Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (assuming, at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss, that representations made on
a consumer website could constitute a written warranty under the MMWA).
242. See id. (reaching the apparent conclusion, without reference to E-SIGN, that
information on a website was a written warranty for purposes of the MMWA).
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I acknowledge that there is a strong argument that the FAA requires a
writing. One might say simply that the FAA requires that an arbitration
provision be in writing to satisfy section 2 and to trigger the coverage of
the statute. But I believe reading the "requirement" language to cover
only those things a statute makes mandatory (i.e., things that must be
true of a record for the record to have any enforceability or validity), not
those things which merely have a consequence, is more apt. First, the
reference in E-SIGN is to a requirement that a contract "be" in writing,
and this use of the imperative connotes a mandatory requirement.
Second, the FAA defines "requirement" as follows: "The term
'requirement' includes a prohibition., 243  While this is not a fully
illuminating definition, it does give a sense that "requirement" indicates
244something that carries some finality, and not merely a consequence.
2. E-SIGN Only Bars a Refusal to Enforce a Contract or Document
Solely Because It Is in Electronic Form
To the extent the FAA is deemed to be a statute that requires a
writing, there is a second argument as to why E-SIGN is not necessarily
dispositive. E-SIGN does not by its terms rewrite any statute-it does
not purport to change every use of the word "written" or "writing" into a
more medium-neutral form like "record." Instead, E-SIGN is results-
oriented and operates, at least per the language of the statute, by
preventing an electronic document or contract from being found invalid,
241ineffective, or unenforceable "solely" because it is in electronic form.
First, consider the possibility that courts begin to conclude that, in the
context of a consumer transaction, arbitration provisions on a website do
not sufficiently register choice and accordingly are not "written" for
purposes of the FAA. These courts would not be reaching that
determination solely because the words on an Internet website are in
electronic form but rather because of relevant defects with one particular
type of electronically displayed text in a specific context. To be sure,
courts may not, consistent with E-SIGN, hold that all documents in
electronic form are excluded from the definition of "written." However,
that does not mean that courts cannot assess the content and form of
specific types of electronically displayed text.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 7006(10).
244. One of the House committee reports accompanying the E-SIGN legislation does
characterize the need for a writing in the FAA as a "requirement." H.R. REP. No. 106-
341, pt. 1, at 9 (1999) ("Under current law, the [FAA] generally requires that arbitration
agreements need to be in writing to be enforceable."). As I argue later, the legislative
history is far from clear as to the impact of E-SIGN on the FAA. See infra notes 262-66
and accompanying text.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
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Further, if a consumer Internet contract is deemed not to be "written"
for purposes of the FAA, the result is not nonenforcement. The result is
that the provision is subject to the full panoply of state law. State law
might provide for full enforcement of arbitration agreements in
electronic form. That would be the case for any state that has adopted
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act24 (RUAA), for example. The
RUAA provides for enforcement of arbitration agreements contained in
a "record",47-a term defined broadly enough to cover virtually all
electronically displayed text.24 But a state does not have to take the
approach of the RUAA and could, instead adopt the Proposed State
Arbitration Law.
What would be the result of finding text on a website in consumer
transactions not to be "written" for purposes of the FAA in a state that
adopts the Proposed State Arbitration Law? If an arbitration provision
is conspicuous, it will be enforced under the Proposed State ArbitrationL 249
Law. If, however, the arbitration provision is not conspicuous, it will
not be enforced. But such nonenforcement does not run afoul of
E-SIGN because the electronic form of the arbitration provision would
not be the sole reason for nonenforcement. Instead, the reason (or at
least one reason) for nonenforcement is the failure of the arbitration
246. UNIF. ARB. ACr (amended 2002), 7 U.L.A. 1 (2005).
247. Id. § 6(a), 7 U.L.A. at 22 ("An agreement contained in a record to submit to
arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or
in equity for the revocation of a contract." (emphasis added)).
248. See id. § 1(6), 7 U.L.A. at 10 (defining "[riecord" as "information that is inscribed
on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable
in perceivable form.").
249. Presumably, a state law along the lines of the Proposed State Arbitration Law
would be applied in federal courts as well as state courts. "[F]ederal courts sitting in
diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law." Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). The proper characterization of arbitration laws
as procedural or substantive is a close one. With respect to the FAA, the Court has held
that section 2 is substantive in nature. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12
(1984) (holding that Section 2 is federal substantive law that is applicable in state courts as
well as federal courts). However, the Court has strongly indicated that other provisions of
the FAA are procedural in nature. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 447 (2006) (characterizing sections 3 and 4 of the FAA as procedural rules
applying only to the federal courts). The Proposed State Arbitration Law is closely
analogous to section 2 of the FAA in that, like section 2, it provides for the general
enforceability of a certain type of arbitration provision. With respect to contracts beyond
the scope of section 2, there should be no bar to the application of state substantive law in
federal courts. Cf Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956)
(indicating that for a contract not within section 2 of the FAA, state law should apply to
determine the contract's enforceability). The Proposed State Arbitration Law does not
conflict with section 2. It simply provides substantive law in an area where federal law
does not apply.
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provision to satisfy the Proposed State Arbitration Law's requirement
for conspicuousness. It is true that were the inconspicuous arbitration
provision in a written form it would probably be enforced under the
FAA. But, to use an analogy from tort law, the electronic status of the
arbitration provision is not the "proximate cause" of nonenforcement.2
And it is certainly not the sole cause of nonenforcement. E-SIGN is
thus, at least arguably, not relevant. There may be circumstances where
an arbitration provision would be denied enforceability, effect, or validity
solely because it is in electronic form. In such a situation, E-SIGN would
be activated to prevent that result and the provision would be enforced.
However, E-SIGN does not automatically replace every reference to
"writing" with the term "record."
The House Commerce Committee Report accompanying the E-SIGN
legislation provides some (admittedly oblique) support for the reading
that E-SIGN does not automatically make all electronically displayed
text "written" for purposes of the FAA. The House Report explicitly
refers to the FAA and notes that E-SIGN would make it possible to
electronically execute a valid agreement that included an arbitration
provision. 5' On the surface, this would seem like a blow to the argument
I am pressing (at least to the extent that we put any weight on legislative
history). In fact, it is not. The House Report is actually referencing only
arbitration provisions in brokerage account agreements.2 The report
notes that the problem is dealt with, not by the general provisions of
E-SIGN (which were in Title I in the draft of E-SIGN to which the
report is referring25 ), but rather through "Title III of the bill. 254 Title III
consisted of suggested amendments that would have explicitly and
specifically applied to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."' Therefore,
it is possible that the Commerce Committee recognized that the general
language of E-SIGN was not sufficient to alter the meaning of "written"
in the FAA.
250. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 411 (2004) (noting that establishing proximate
cause requires showing that a defendant's conduct "is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury."
(footnotes omitted)). The failure to comply with a state notice requirement, such as the
Proposed State Arbitration Law, could thus be classed as an "efficient, intervening cause."
251. H.R. REP. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 9 (1999).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2-3.
254. Id. at 9.
255. Id. at 4-5.
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3. Applicability of E-SIGN's Consumer Protection Provisions
The consumer protection provisions in E-SIGN are also relevant, and
may blunt E-SIGN's impact when it comes to arbitration provisions in
consumer Internet transactions. E-SIGN provides a number of
consumer protections that apply to statutes that "require[] that
information relating to a transaction or transactions in or affecting
interstate ... commerce be provided or made available to a consumer in
writing."56 As I discuss later, there is some doubt as to whether the FAA
was intended to apply to consumer transactions at all.257 But to the
extent it does,"' the FAA is arguably a statute that "requires that
information relating to a transaction ... be provided or made available to
a consumer in writing." '259 An arbitration provision is "information,"
especially given the broad definition that E-SIGN gives to that word.26°
To the extent that the FAA is a statute requiring a written disclosure to
consumers, then an electronic record will satisfy the requirement that
information be provided in writing only if there is compliance with a
number of consumer protection provisions.26'
For instance, a consumer must affirmatively assent to the use ofrecods nsted o "" 262
records instead of writings, a consumer must be given a conspicuous
disclosure statement of various consumer rights,263 and a consumer must
be informed of the "hardware and software requirements for access to
and retention of the electronic records. ', 26' As Professor Jane Winn has
noted, it is likely that "any merchant entering into an agreement with a
consumer that includes an arbitration agreement must comply" with
265these consumer protections. If these requirements are not satisfied, an
arbitration provision in electronic form should not be considered a
"written agreement., 266
256. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1) (2000).
257. See infra Part V.B.
258. See Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001 Developments, 57 BUS. LAW.
541, 566 (2001) (noting that enforcement of arbitration provisions in consumer
transactions has become more certain in the last several years).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1).
260. Id. § 7006(7) ("'[I]nformation' means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer
programs, software, databases, or the like.").
261. Id. § 7001(c)(1).
262. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(A).
263. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B).
264. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(i).
265. Winn, supra note 258, at 568.
266. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1); see also Winn, supra note 258, at 568-69 (arguing that
a merchant who has failed to comply with the required consumer protections will not have
obtained a written contract and that an electronic arbitration provision under such
circumstances will not be enforceable). E-SIGN indicates that one particular type of
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To summarize, while I acknowledge several arguments that E-SIGN
requires that "written" in the FAA be read to include electronic
documents, there are a number of reasons why E-SIGN will not and
should not always have this effect, especially in the consumer context.
And given that the technological landscape on which E-SIGN was based
has shifted, courts should read E-SIGN, where possible, in a limited way.
V. INTERPRETING "WRITTEN" TO HELP RESTORE CONGRESS'
ORIGINAL INTENT REGARDING THE FAA
A. Rebalancing the Federal-State Relationship in Regulating Arbitration
Agreements
The FAA was designed to split the regulation of arbitration provisions
between state and federal law. This design is demonstrated by the
limited scope of section 2 and by the savings clause. It is possible that
Congress had in mind that the FAA would apply only in the federal
courts and hence leave a fairly robust role for state law.267 It is also
possible that Congress had in mind that the FAA would cover a
significant share of arbitration provisions.268
But it seems unlikely that Congress intended that the FAA would
govern virtually all arbitration provisions. That is, even if Congress saw
the FAA as more than just a procedural statute for the federal courts, a
Congress legislating prior to the New Deal would not have considered
the scope of the Commerce Clause to be as nearly all encompassing as
the Supreme Court has since held.269 Thus, Congress may have thought
the FAA would cover arbitration provisions only in the federal courts, or
it may have thought the FAA would cover arbitration provisions within
the reach of the Commerce Clause as that reach was then understood.
But Congress almost certainly did not intend the current lopsided
balance between the respective roles for state and federal law, especially
given that the FAA developed out of, and built upon, state law
failure to comply with E-SIGN's consumer protection provisions-a failure to obtain
consent in a manner that "reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can access
information in the electronic form that will be used to provide the information that is the
subject of the consent"-does not by itself make a contract unenforceable. 15 U.S.C. §
7001(c)(3); id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii).
267. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21-36 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the legislative history and the structure of the FAA demonstrate
that the Act was intended only to apply in federal courts).
268. The Court has generally accepted this position. See discussion supra Part II.A.
269. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995) (conceding
that "[t]he pre-New Deal Congress that passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought
the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has turned out to be the case").
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developments in arbitration,"O and given that contract and consumer
protection laws are traditionally within the province of the states."
Limiting the scope of the FAA through the "written" limitation is one
way to restore a meaningful role for states in the regulation of arbitration
provisions.
B. Consumer Transactions and the FAA
Ensuring state law some space in the area of consumer protection as it
relates to arbitration provisions, either through explicit amendment to
E-SIGN or through a comparatively narrow judicial reading of "written,"
is particularly appropriate. As others have ably discussed, the legislative
history of the FAA indicates that Congress did not contemplate that the
FAA would apply to transactions between consumers and merchants."
Similarly, in a statement before the subcommittee considering the FAA,
Julius Henry Cohen noted that the rule of revocability came about
because:
at the time this [common law] rule was made people were not
able to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the
stronger men would take advantage of the weaker, and the
courts had to come in and protect them. And the courts said,
"If you let the people sign away their rights, the powerful
people will come in and take away the rights of the weaker
ones. ,,273
Although according to Cohen such a situation still existed "to a certain
extent" at the time of the passage of the FAA, he argued that "people
are protected to-day [sic] [in 1924] as never before. 274 Cohen noted, for
example, that there was protection against arbitration provisions in
insurance contracts because a governmental "insurance department"
270. See discussion supra Part I.B.
271. See Moses, supra note 152, at 156.
272. See id. at 106-08 (assessing the legislative history and concluding that the hearings
during which the FAA was debated "make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-
to-merchant arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations"); Sternlight, supra
note 132, at 1636 (noting that "to the limited extent that the possibility of [arbitration
provisions in consumer and other similar transactions] was considered by Congress in
1925, when it passed the FAA, those few who spoke on the issue made clear that they did
not view such a use of arbitration as appropriate"); Linda Alle-Murphy, Comment, Are
Compulsory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts Enforceable? A Contractual
Analysis, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 125, 137-40 (2002) (reviewing legislative history of the FAA
and concluding that the Act was designed to protect consumers).
273. Joint Arbitration Hearings, supra note 7, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen,
Member, American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial
Law; General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce).
274. Id.
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would have to approve inclusion of the term.25 He noted that bills of
lading were also governed by legislation that limited the terms a shipper
could include in a bill of lading.26 Cohen thus seems to have had in mind
that the FAA would apply between sophisticated entities or, at least, in
areas that were highly regulated. Cohen observed, for example, that
arbitration "is a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the
ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact.
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Given that consumer transactions are not highly regulated it may be
appropriate to provide states with the ability to regulate at least some
arbitration provisions in consumer transactions. Arbitration provisions
in consumer Internet transactions are a particularly appropriate place to
give states that authority.
CONCLUSION
The FAA's limitation to written provisions is one of the last ways
through which space for meaningful state regulation of arbitration
provisions can be secured. Reading the word "written" to exclude
electronically displayed text is consistent with the meaning given to that
word in commercial circles and is true to the purposes of the FAA's
"written" limitation. E-SIGN is not an impediment to such a reading.
Judicial interpretation of "written" along the lines I urge would ensure
that the states have a vibrant role in protecting consumers when it comes
to arbitration provisions in cyberspace. If the states perform poorly in
this regard, or if their actions unduly endanger electronic commerce,
then Congress has the power to easily remove this last vestige of space.
But state law should, at the very least, be allowed to have a go of it.
275. Id.
276. Id. The then-existing Uniform Bills of Lading Act set forth the terms of a bill of
lading and governed the ability of the carrier to include additional terms. UNIF. BILLS OF
LADING Acr §§ 2-3 (superseded by U.C.C. art. 7 (1962)(amended 2003)), 3A U.L.A. app.
I at 62-63 (2002).
277. Id. (emphasis added).
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